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RES JUDICATA IN SOUTH CAROLINA
JUDGE LANNEAU D. LIDE*
This title is not intended to suggest that res judicata has
pursued a novel course in this State, but simply to indicate
that this rather cursory review of some of the high lights of
this legal doctrine is based primarily upon our own decisions.
Res judicata, literally meaning matter adjudicated, is some-
what unique because it is an essential principle in any effec-
tive legal system, and consequently it is said to form a part
of the legal systems of all civilized nations.
The following quotation from 30 Am. Jur. 910-911 clearly
states the basis of this doctrine:
The doctrine of res judicata may be said to inhere in
the legal systems of all civilized nations as an obvious
rule of expediency, justice, and public tranquility. Public
policy and the interest of litigants alike require that there
be an end to litigation which, without the doctrine of
res judicata, would be endless. The doctrine of res judi-
cata rests upon the ground that the party to be affected,
or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated,
or had an opportunity to litigate, the same matter in a
former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and
should not be permitted to litigate it again to the harass-
ment and vexation of his opponent.
It is frequently suggested that this doctrine is merely a
branch of the law of estoppel, which is essentially an equitable
principle, but clearly estoppel is rather a collateral principle,
although sometimes applicable; and the distinction between
these two legal concepts is accurately shown by the case
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of Watson v. Goldsmith, 205 S. C. 215, 31 S. E. 2d 317
(1944). We quote the following from the opinion in that case,
which was delivered by Mr. Justice Stukes:
Estoppel rests generally on equitable principles, which
res judicata does not, but upon the two maxims which
were its foundation in the Roman law, memo debet bis
vexari pro eadem causa. (no one ought to be twice sued
for the same cause of action) and interest reipublicae ut
sit finis litium (it is the interest of the state that there
should be an end of litigation.) Contemporary laymen
devised a possibly uncomplimentary comment, res judi-
cata facit ex albo nigrum, ex nigro album, ex curvo rec-
tum, ex recto curvum (a decision makes white black;
black, white; the crooked, straight; the straight crooked).
The quoted excerpt is quite interesting and informative,
and shows what might have been expected, namely, that the
valuable principle of res judicata necessarily conflicts occa-
sionally with the ethical maxim that nothing is decided until
it is decided right. Consequently, it was necessarily held in
the case of Greenwood County v. Watkins, 196 S. C. 51, 12
S. E. 2d 545 (1940), that it is well settled in this State that
the rulings in a case, even though admittedly they be wrong,
become the law of the case, and are res judicata between the
parties.
The American doctrine of res judicata, in general, has its
source in the English case cited as the Duchess of Kingston's
case; and in one of the early cases, to wit, Hart v. Bates,
17 S. C. 35 (1881), it is held that according to the Duchess
of Kingston's case (2 Sm. Lead. Cas. 424) "three things are
necessary to sustain the plea of res judicata: 1, the parties
must be the same, or their privies; 2, the subject-matter must
be the same; 3, the precise point must have been ruled."
This is indeed a valuable statement of the essential ele-
ments, but like most formulas, especially when expressed
so concisely, it was subject to variation and modification in
the course of legal history.
Considering these elements in the inverse order; the third
was early seen to be stated too narrowly, and it was some-
times said that a judgment was conclusive of every question
which might have been made in the case. But in the Hart
V. Bates case it was held that a judgment is conclusive only
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of matters that had of necessity to be determined before the
judgment could have been given. But this is another state-
ment which is not altogether adequate. Indeed, the follow-
ing quotation from one of our later cases, to wit, Johnston-
Crews Co. v. Folk, 118 S. C. 470, 111 S. E. 15 (1921), in
which the opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Cothran, is
much more accurate and comprehensive:
As to the third element as stated above: In the case
of Hart v. Bates, 17 S. C., 35, the element is stated in
rather tabloid form thus: "The precise point must have
been ruled." This requires some amplification. If the
identity of the parties and the identity of the causes of
action have been established, the former adjudication is
conclusive, not only of the precise issues raised and de-
termined, but such as might have been raised affecting
the main issue. If the identity of the parties has been
established, but the identity of the causes of action has
not, any issue appearing upon the record or by extrin-
sic evidence to have been adjudicated in the former suit
is conclusive upon the parties in a subsequent action. If
the identity of the parties has been established but the
identity of the causes of action has not, the former judg-
ment is conclusive only as to those issues actually deter-
mined; that is, the rule of conclusiveness as to matters
which might have been litigated has no application.
The views expressed by Judge Cothran indicate that there
is some overlapping between the three essential elements
of the principle under discussion, and they cannot be con-
sidered as entirely separate and independent.
The rather novel and interesting case of Kirven v. Vir-
ginia-Carolina Chemical Co., 77 S. C. 493, 58 S. E. 424, was
decided in 1907, and at that time the Supreme Court consisted
of the Chief Justice and three Associate Justices, and when
the Court was equally divided the result was the affirmance
of the Circulit Court.
The facts out of which this case arose were that Kirven
had given his note to the Chemical Company in a certain
sum for fertilizers which he had bought from the Company,
which upon maturity of the note brought action against him
on the obligation, which was instituted in the United States
Circuit Court. Kirven's answer at first contained the defense
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that the fertilizers furnished were deleterious and destruc-
tive to crops, but later he was permitted to withdraw this
defense. This action resulted in a judgment in favor of the
Chemical Company. Thereafter Kirven instituted in the Court
of Common Pleas the action against the Chemical Company
which came to our Supreme Court, based upon his complaint
that the defendant Company was liable to him for damages
by reason of the deleterious and destructive character of the
fertilizers sold to him, and the case came on to be tried be-
fore Judge Klugh and a jury, resulting in a verdict for the
plaintiff, Kirven; and from the judgment entered thereon
the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court.
It was duly contended in the trial of the case that the judg-
ment rendered in the United States Circuit Court in favor
of the Chemical Company on the note given by Kirven for
the fertilizers in question was a bar to his action in the State
Court, because res judicata. But upon the appeal the leading
opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Gary, which held that
while the actions were between the same parties, they were
upon different claims, one being upon a promissory note and
the other for unliquidated damages, and besides, the ques-
tion raised in the State Court was not actually litigated and
determined in the Federal Court. Mr. Justice Woods filed a
concurring opinion in which he stated, among other things:
Having such a cause of action against the Virginia-
Carolina Chemical Company, Kirven had a right to choose
his own time and his own tribunal for asserting it, and
could not be forced to assert it at the time and before
the tribunal chosen by the Company. This conclusion is,
I think, in accord with the principles laid down in Hart
v. Bates, 17 S. C., 40.
However, Chief Justice Pope filed a dissenting opinion to
the effect that the Federal Court having adjudged that the
fertilizers were of such value that Kirven was required to
pay the note given for the same, the resulting judgment was
a bar to his action in the State Court "as a matter of public
policy"; and Mr. Justice Jones concurred in the view that
there should be a reversal upon this ground. The result was
that the judgment of the Circuit Court was affirmed by an
equally divided Court.
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The foregoing recital sufficiently shows that the Kirven
case not only relates to the third essential element of res
judicata, but also to the second element, which is that the sub-
ject-matter must be the same. The phrase "subject-matter"
is more comprehensive than "cause of action"; and one of
the corollaries of the principle of res judicata is that a cause
of action must not be split. Lawton v. New York Life Insur-
ance Co., 181 S. C. 230, 186 S. E. 909 (1936).
Since the cause of action may not be split, the same rule
logically applies to a claim set up by way of defense, and the
leading case of Mitchell v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank
of Columbia, 165 S. C. 457, 164 S. E. 136, 83 A. L. R. 629
(1932), is quite apposite, for it was therein held:
One who sets up as a defense to an action on promis-
sory notes liability of the holders to him in a sum in
excess of the amount of the notes, without seeking af-
firmative relief, cannot, even though successful in es-
tablishing such defense, thereafter maintain a separate
action against such holders for the balance.
The opinion in this case, delivered by Mr. Justice Stabler,
is of special value because of its comprehensive considera-
tion of the relevant authorities, including of course the Kir-
wen case, which was properly distinguished in certain re-
spects. But the Court rather clearly intimates that the Kirven
case, decided by an evenly divided Court, in the light of later
decisions, is at least of limited authority, although the same
was not overruled.
But in the application of the elements of res judicata to
cases involving varying and unusual facts and conditions,
the most difficult one of the elements is the first, namely,
"the parties must be the same, or their privies." Of course
where the parties are actually the same there is no difficulty.
But what is privity in this sense? The word "privity" is de-
fined in Baldwin's Century Edition of Bouvier's Law Dic-
tionary as: "The mutual or successive relationship to the same
rights of property." But this is too concise, and we quote
the following more explanatory statement from 72 C. J. S.
954-955:
Although it has been said that there is no definition
of the word "privity" which can be applied in all cases,
as most generally defined, and in its broadest sense, "priv-
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ity" is the mutual or successive relationship to the same
right of property, or such an identification in interest
of one person with another as to represent the same legal
right.
An unusually interesting case to students of this general
subject, especially because of the extraordinary facts which
prevented the application of res judicata., is that of Battle
v. DeVane, et al., reported in 140 S. C. 305, 138 S. E. 821,
and decided July 6, 1927.
It appears that Mr. Battle, together with his brother and
sister, conveyed on September 14, 1917, the timber upon cer-
tain lands, including the small tract involved in this litiga-
tion, situate in Horry County, to a certain Lumber Company
for a period of five years. The timber deed was in the usual
form, except that it did not contain a general warranty and
only warranted the title against the grantors and their heirs;
and sometime after this timber deed was executed Mr. Battle
acquired the interest of his brother and sister.
The Lumber Company having commenced to cut and re-
move the timber, an action in trespass was brought in the
Court of Common Pleas for Horry County by one Soles, who
claimed title to the land in dispute, and an injunction pen-
dente lite against the Lumber Company was issued by the
Court. This case was tried in due course, and resulted in a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff, Soles, who was thereupon
adjudged to be the owner in fee simple of the land in ques-
tion, and a permanent injunction was issued against the de-
fendant Lumber Company, there being no other parties to
this action; and there was no appeal from this judgment.
After the judgment in favor of Soles he conveyed the tim-
ber on the land in question to Mr. DeVane, who commenced
to cut and remove the same, whereupon Mr. Battle brought
an action in trespass in the Court of Common Pleas for Horry
County against DeVane, Soles and an agent of DeVane; and
an injunction pendente lite against the defendants was duly
issued by the Court. This case came on for trial, and at the
first trial thereof resulted in a verdict in favor of the de-
fendants. But upon appeal to the Supreme Court the judg-
ment of the Circuit Court was reversed and the case remanded
for a new trial, as will appear by reference to the opinion
above mentioned, which shows that the reversal was mainly
due to errors in the charge of the Presiding Judge.
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It further appears that in the course of this trial the de-
fendants offered in evidence the judgment in the case brought
by Soles against the Lumber Company as res judica , but
the trial Judge held that it was not effective as such, although
he admitted it in evidence "for what it is worth in order to es-
tablish a chain of title." The Supreme Court made the follow-
ing statement with regard to this matter:
The record was admissible to support the claim of res
adjudicata, or not at all. We shall not consider its admis-
sibility for that purpose, for the reason that the Circuit
Judge refused to admit it for that purpose. It should
have been admitted to, sustain the claim or excluded en-
tirely.
Upon the new trial ordered by the Supreme Court the Pre-
siding Judge excluded the judgment, holding that it could
not operate as res judicat, and the result of that trial was in
favor of the plaintiff, Battle, who was adjudged to be the
owner of the premises in fee simple, and the defendants were
permanently enjoined from entering upon the tract of land;
and there was no appeal.
The result was that Battle found himself as the indefeasible
owner of the land in question with the timber thereon prac-
tically intact. Such a result may seem anomalous, but when
all of the facts are known and considered there is no doubt
but that the result was in full accordance with the established
law. It is quite true that there may have appeared to be priv-
ity between Battle and the Lumber Company because the
latter was his grantee, but there was no privity as related
to res judicata for the simple reason that Battle was under
no obligation to the Lumber Company to defend the title,
and the well recognized rule laid down in the case of Newell
Construction Co. v. Blankemship, 130 S. C. 131, 125 S. E. 420
(1924), was directly applicable; and we quote the following
from the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Cothran:
So that, in order to invoke the principle of res adjudi-
cata against one not a party to the action in which the
judgment was obtained, it must appear, in the action in
which that principle is invoked: (1) That such person
was legally bound to, at least partially, indemnify the
defendant in the first action against the recovery suffered
by him therein.
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It should also be mentioned that while Mr. Battle testified
in behalf of the defendant in the trial of the case of Soles
against the Lumber Company, there was no evidence that he
otherwise concerned himself with that litigation, and hence
could not be deemed in anywise a party to the same. See 30
Am. Jur. 960-961, and Whaley v. Houser, 18 S. C. 602 (1882).
Finally, we mention another important case involving the
question of privity, decided by the Supreme Court by a vote
of three to two, namely, the case of First National Bank of
Greenville v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 207 S. C.
15, 35 S. E. 2d 47, 162 A. L. R. 1003 (1945). The holding
in this case will be clearly seen by reference to the annotated
syllabus, which is as follows:
Guardian and ward are in privity with each other so
as to satisfy the condition of res judi'cata in that regard,
where the surety on the official bond of a probate judge,
in an action by a guardian, in its individual capacity, to
recoup the loss sustained by the guardian when compelled
to reimburse the ward for the latter's funds which it
had improperly delivered to the probate judge, asserts
as a bar a judgment in a previous action to which the
ward (represented by a guardian ad litem), but not
the guardian, was a party, absolving the surety from
liability in respect of the ward's funds on the ground
that the probate judge had no legal authority to receive
them.
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